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Th~ ~arion of m lcl w:~r and the disintegration of the Wn.rsaw Pact in 
the early ninrics confronu:d NATO will1 uGw cholkng.es, p:utkularly in the 
rc<ltion to the countries of Europe's East and South,J::.asl and R~•u. Tllc fact 
that th~ dOUJrucut " PnrtneP•hip for Pe:tcc~ was adopted at the Start of 1994 
and that it was signed bv 26 cvuntne,~ m~.ant lhe owraJI :u...-:t"pt:lnce of the 
ron~rptu:ll document of F.uropean security on the rrcshold of the 21st century. 
I hi.~ documem provid~ dem~'latic oouotries ou~:&ide ATO \\ith the possibility 
of cooperating_ ";th its political and military bodies and pu,-c:. the Wll) fu• their 
full member..hip. 
If regular crit«ia were applil::d, Croatia and .Bosnia and Hc:rt."-"gU\ ina wuld 
t.uunt un Joining " P:utot.>r!.hip for Pe:~ce- only afkr they ha\'e resolved internal 
contlias and friction.~ ~1tb their oetgbbour.. by political ~ 
There i' no single npinion about the place. the role and the impact of 
NA rO tn presem-day inrema1ional relations. There arc those who see 
~ATO as a progressive military-poliricaJ alliance who'<: main task is to 
provide peace, freedom and independence as well as inte rnational in-
volvement of a ll democratic '\latcs. TI1il also includes its gradual expansion 
to new countries in Eastern and Southeastern Europe. Sm:h vit:w is sup-
ported hy Germany, in particular by its Minister of Defence, Volke r 
Riihe, who advocates the idea that the degree of achieved democracy in 
these countries is a solid ground for their involvement because "if the 
West does not export stability, it will import instabilhy''. A similar view is 
shared by the American research Rand corporation, d<1iming that "NATO 
has to stcp o ut of the defiJled regionnl frameworks or it will come to 
nothing". These attitudes an; also shared by those who believe that 
"danger does not come from the Russians but from regional wars such as 
thl: one iJ) Bosnia-Hercegovina and in Transcaucasia'•.l Others do not 
' According to Vidusi~ c., " NATO ili - D0 \-1 vojn.i savez'?'' Nedjeijna J)a/-
maclja, u~cmbcr 15, 1993, p. 32. 
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favour fast ch•mges in the nrganization, tasks and number of NA rO 
members, justifying this ao; a meas ure uimed at preventing the escalation 
of ex tremism in Russia_ These include primarily the United States, France 
and Great Britain, which offer cooperation with Eastern and Southeastern 
European countries thruugh the "Partnership for Peace" as a piecemeal 
process of their joining NATO after they fuJffil the defined and rigorous 
criteria_ There is a substimtial number of those who feel that the place 
ami role of NATO as an organization is becoming less and less atlecpHlte 
in present-day post cold war time and that it -; role should be taken over 
by sume o ther organinttion such as Lhc Organization fnr European Secu-
rity and Coopenition or the Western Europe(ln Union. Such sl<tndpoints 
are also advocated by Rus..'lia which opposes NATO's expansic.tn in Enstern 
and Southeastern Europe and suppu rls the Organizalion for European Se-
curity and Cooperation_ Alouw-ide with the growing Russian influence 
there an: those factors in the West which fear that Russian ontionali~t 
forces are gaining rower. ln order In view the present position of NATO 
in internatiomtl relations and the perspective uf its expansion in Eastern 
and Southeastern European countries, it is necessary to examine the rcu-
nn~ why NATO was established how it work!. anti how it is structured 
I. 
North Atlantic Treaty was si~med in Washington on April 4, 194'>. and 
was effected on August 2~ of the same year. The Treaty was il:,rned by 
Belgium. C..anada. Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy. Luxembourg, the Neth-
erlautls, Norway, Portug~l, the USA and Great Britain. The numbt:r of 
tales amounted to fourteen during the Korean wnr, wbe.n Grt:ccc and 
Turkey joinetl the Treaty in accordance with provisions from 1\rticle 10 of 
the Treat~.' Three years later, on the basis of Memhersh1p ProtO<.:ul, 
adopted in Paris on October 23, 1954, and coming into effect on May 5, 
l955, the TrcHty was also sibrned by West Germany, and Spain became 
the sixteenth member nf the Treaty in 1982_3 North Atlantic Treaty con-
taill5 a preambuk and 14 articles. In the preambule the contract parties 
emphasize their desire to provide peace and freedom fnr their people a~ 
well u independence ;md possibiJity of international involvement for states, 
reaffirming the ir faith in gnah: and ptinciples of the UN Charter and 
2 l'rntocole on Greece's and Turkey's joining wns 1>i.gned in Loodou on Octo-
her 22. 195J, an<i came into force on February IR, 1<152 
3 lnterest.iugly, in 1966 Frnnce stepped out of the integrated m.ililary organi7.a-
tinn without leaving the Treaty, Greece diet the snme in 1974, but rejoined the 
orgauiauion in 1980_ 
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readiness to put together all their potentiaL'\ for collective defence and the 
preservation of peace and security. In an attempt to meet these goals, 
the C1uuter provides the foUowing obligations for its member states:4 
peaceful settlement of international dispTJtes, refraining from threats and 
the use of force, whkh is not in accordance with the UN Charter 
(Article I); development of political ami economic cooperation within the 
T reaty (Article 2); strengthening of individual and collective defence in 
case of aggression (At1icle 3); mutual agreement in case any of the mem-
ber states is threatened (Article 4). Article 5 specifies mutuaJ assistance in 
case of armed attack on any member states.5 This nrtic.le shows that the 
Treaty allows complete freedom to each member state to decide what to 
do in case of armed attack on any of the members nf lhc North Atlcmlic 
Treaty, with the aim of supporting the Treaty partners. The above facts 
·how that the obligation of support is nnt automatic and the forms of 
assistance are not defjned.6 Article 6 defines the territory covered by the 
Treaty. Besides the territories of member states in Europe and North 
America the Treaty inclmles the " A.lgeria.n department of France/ isla.nd-; 
under the jurisdiction of each of the orth Atlnntic states north of the 
tropic of Canoer"S , as well the waters of the Mediterranean. Article 7 
empbnsizes the legal compatibility of the Tre<~ty with Article 103 of the 
4 For more details 011 this issue see: Miletic /\.., Froacusktl i 1\t/antski sovez. 
Beograd: Savremena administracija, 1973, rr- :~0-50; Crishchenko A. ct al., 
Dooger: NATO, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1985, pp. 16-33. 
5 Since Article 5 rerresents ihe key point ot the Trea ty, it is cited verb<~tirn : 
"Treaty pani~ agree Lbat auy urmcu ullut:k uu one or more purlics oceuring in 
Europe or North Americ::t wiU be considered as an a ttack on all of them. ln ac-
conlancc with lbis agreement, if some aitack takes place, each of the parties will 
ass ist the Treaty party or parties in order to realize the right of individual or 
collective self-defence, recognized in Article 51 of the Uniled Nation Chaner, 
taking immediate action, individually or with agreement of other Treaty panies, 
which it sees fit, including the use of armed forces so a<; to estahlish and pro-
vide security in the area of North Atlantic. Any armed attack of such kind uud 
any measure taken will he immediately reported to rhe UN Security Council. 
Measures taken will be ended when the Secu1 ity Couucil takes actiou for estab-
lishing and maintaining intern:t tional peace and security."' Encydopaedit1 Brita.n.nica, 
Vol. 16, 1963, p. 5l9A. 
6 Such evaluation is in accordance with American official interpretation of AJ'-
tidc 5 oi the North Atlantic Treaty, which says that "The Treaty does not im-
pose automatic obligation of war declaration in case of casus foederis , or, iu 
other words, help provided for the attacked alliance can be, bur need not be of 
military nature, which depends on tht: t:stimution of those wiJo proviuc it in par-
ticular cases .. .'', Miletic A , or. cir., 1973, p. 31. 
7 Upon the dcduralion of Algeria's inucpcnucocc, on July 3, '1962, its tcrrilmy 
ceased being covered by the Treaty. 
8 Encyc!opaema Britannica, ibid., p . 519A 
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United Nation Charter') , while Artidc 8 proclaims higln:r lega l power of 
the Treaty in relation to aU other obligations of the Treaty members both 
in thu past and in the future. Article 9 inrroduces the Council as the 
highest and at that time only body of the ortb Atlantic Treaty. The 
Council meets as required :md is made of rc::prcsentatives of all member 
slates. Article 10 stipulates that the Tn.:Hty can be joult:LI only by Euro-
pe<1n countries which receive unanimous invitation fr<Jm a ll those who 
have already signed the Treaty.10 Article 12 stipulates that each party to 
the Treaty can a ·k for revision of the Treaty after it ha been in effect 
for ten years. Each party em resign by giviiig ;t one year notice, twc::nty 
years after the Treaty came into effect. which is stipulated hy the follow-
ing article. Finally, it should he noted that signatory countries of tl11:: 
Trcaly emphasize that it is a defence alliam:e of sovereign ami independ-
ent countries of unlimited defensive character. 
It has already been "t:u ed that the urlh Atlantic Treaty hac;; not, wJth 
the exception of the Council, formed any other pemument bodies. How-
ever, on the basis of authoritie provided in Article 9 of the orth At-
lantic Treaty11 , on Lhc h<~sis of numerou~ decisions the Council set up an 
organizatio n known as NATO (North Atlantic Trcaly O rganization), which 
has its permanent independent bodies - civilian and military, hierarchi-
calJy structured and with muruaJJy divided and coordinated <mthorities. The 
Council a~ the highest and le.1ding body of NATO assembles repn:.,cnta-
ti'c~ from all the member srates. Depemling on the importance of issues 
to be considered, these can be ministers of foreign affairs, defence or li-
nanciol mini ters or even prime ministers. lu order for the Council to 
work continuously between ministerial meetings, the Pt:rmanent Council 
W;lS established in 1952, which a:sembles permanently in one place rcpre-
senraLiVL'!' of a ll member •.tates at ambas ador level. Permanent M <lin Sec-
retary Office with the position of Main Secretary wa<; established. Today, 
the meeting.' of the Council arc chaired by the Main Secretary and only 
those decision which were made unanimously are considered to he binding 
fnr a ll member slates. The Couucil eonsiclers and draws directions of civil-
ian and milit~ry orienta tion, establishes, changes o r dismisses civilian or 
military bodies: appoint~ lc;ading people in civilian or mili tary hodies; de-
cides oo financial i sues, supervises the implementation of its decision~. 
9 TI1i:. article of the U, Cbaner is as follow:.: 1n case of couflid between 
UN members ' obligations towards this Cburlcr ~nd their obligation toward~ a uy 
oL11er iulcrnatinMI agrcemeul their ohligatioos luwanJs thi~ CharLer prevail." 
10 In accordance with this Article. Greece. Turkey, Wcsl Ciennan}' and Spain 
joined the l'rca ty a,o; swtcd above. This wu:. also ra tified in parliaments in all 
member countrit-"l> and the same pwccdure wfll be applied today when accepting 
new member'\ - counuies of Eastern and Southeastern Europe. 
11 This article e mphasizes that tbe Coum:il can cre:~te assist.ing bodies which 
have provt.:d to he needed. 
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Main Secretary Office is also a civilian body with a rather wide range of 
authorili~s. ft consists of five division with divided competencies: for poljti-
~•1 matters; for economic-financial issues; for production, logistic.-; am.l in-
frastructure; for resem·ch and Executive Secretaty Office. 1\ large number 
of committees have been set up by the Coum,;] for milita1y and civilian 
issues.12 
Military Committee is the highest military body in the complex NATO 
pymmiu. It is made of heads of supreme am1y commands of all member 
states, except lcelanu, which is reprcst:ntcu uy one civilian representative 
due to the fact that it does not have its own military forces, while 
France is represented by one liaison officer upon its resignation from 
NATO (its nlilita1y division). Chief comm<tnLis arc the next lnwe::r level in 
the IIUlitary pyramid. All important regions embraeed by the North Atlan-
tic Tre::aty are covered by a net of permanent and integral militmy chiefs-
of-staff of chief commands. These Hre Allied Commanu Europe 13 , Allied 
Command Atlantic, La Mancbe Command as well as .Kegional Strategic 
Group for Planning USA-C'..anada. Each of them supe1vises a number of 
lower level commands. Lower integrated commands are at the level of 
military groups and tactical air forces.14 
The beginning of the Korean war (June 25, 1~50) worsened the al-
ready bad inlernaliunal situation anu proved right those who had pre-
dicted further conflicts between the West and the East. At the NATO 
Council meeting in New York on September 15, 1950, evaluating the new 
conditions as rather dissalisfaclory fm the security nf the West, a J ccisinn 
was reached about the establishment "of an integrated force under central 
command capable of preventing aggression and providing defence for 
Western Europe". 1s In other words, signatmy countries of the North At-
lantic Treaty agreed to establish integrated military forces. This actually 
means that national militruy forces are put under command of A.llied 
Command Europe. According to the .level of integration there are basical.ly 
three kinds of militaty forces. Hierarchically speaking, the most important 
are tbe so called assigned militaty forces16 . During. peace time they are 
12 Gersn.k T., "Severnoatlanskn. zveza od uotraj - osnovoa nacela delovaoja'' 
J<evija Ohramba., 9, 1994, p. 4. 
13 J\.Uied Commaud Europe llas four subordinate COIDJUauds: for uortlle ru 
Europe, for central Europe, for southern Europe 11nd for the Mediterranelln. For 
more see: Vojna ~nci.kloped.jja, 2nJ ediliou, vol VIII, BelgraJe, 1974, p. 1974. 
14 See: Gersak T., "Poveljstvo zveze NATO", Revij~'l Obramba, 11, 1994, p. 4-
5. 
15 Javorovic B. e.t nl., Suvreme.ni obnunbeni sistemi Z agreb: Fakultet politick.ih 
znanosti, l9lJO, p. 165. 
16 Diffe rent kinds of NATO military forces are listed according to Miletic, A , 
op. cit, p. 36. 
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under national commands, but arc statiOned in the way planned by Su-
pn:me Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). The use of Lhe..,e forces IS 
planned in cal>c of emergencies in accordance witlt lhe member stale 
providing lhe forces. Anothcr ca tegory is matlc of so c<.~ lled "earmarked" 
forces. ln accordance with common ph:ms of NATO Opeml.ion Command, 
those are forces which will be appointed to this Command at a specific 
time. They have to be sLalioned where they Mrc planned to be deployed. 
The third group includes forces which ar~ not ~assignt:d- nnr -earmarked" 
beforeha nd and they are exclusively nauonal force.'> and each state main-
ta ins ubsolute control and command over them. 
Military s trategy of the Nonh Atlantic Trc<tly has fo r many yc<~rs rep-
rt!Sented an an:;1 of American military strategy due to lbe posllton the 
United Slates of America held regarding nuckar power, at the same time 
emerging as the mnl->1 powerful Western country and NATO leader. 1n its 
fo rty years' existence, within tlH! system of "collective security", N/\ TO es-
tablished the so caUed cwtlition doctrine. Bma.:d on the basic concepts of 
American post-war military stra tegy which postulated that "the detence of 
the USA . tarts in Europe'', ao; well as that the European front favours 
the fnnner USSR mort: hecause the re. l nf Europe is connected with it 
hy land and tlmt lhe position of the USA is harder hccause of its geo-
graphical uisumce and tbe Atll'tntic Ocean which separates it frnm the 
Eurnpmm front, the USA constantly brought up the probll:m of defence 
of European members of NATO. This resulted in frequent correctionl< 
ot the accepted strategic.\. In the first few post-war yean;. ATO's 
"coalition doctrine" wHo; based on Amcric.m nuclear monuJXlly. Uased on 
clear nuclear advantage over the "enemy", the milihtry strategy of "mass 
nuclear re tribution" was established. The forces of the sword, which in-
cluded nuclear arml< ;,s the essential w<~r factor, and the forces of the 
shield, which were made of conventional forces. were intended fnr the 
realization of this strategy. The bottom line of the strategy was to re· 
l<pond to each USSR' anack by a hem'Y nuclear brunt. The assumption 
of the stratep was that the other ide does not hav~:: appropriate arms at 
its dispo:;aiY However, the extensive development of nuclear power and 
the growth of nuclear power of the USSR soon showed that the use of 
this '·defen c arm" would equaiJy destroy both the a ttacking anti the de-
fending ide and frequently a third side a well, which would find itself 
completely ouL\ide the political (military) conflict. A!-. a response to thi-. 
realization, Kennedy's strategy of "flexib le response"1~ was prochtimed and 
it Wi'IS applied with s(lme corrections until the end of lhe bloc division in 
' ' For more see: Vukat.linovic R, Nuldc:ame ~crategije .~up.:rsila Z-agreb. 
Aug11st Cesorc<.:, 1985. pp. 109-121. 
1R In J 962 it was introduccu in lhe USA, and ilt 1967 it hecAme NATO's of-
ficin I sLrategy. 
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the early nineties19 • General John Galvin, former commander uf ATO 
forces in Europe said ahuut this strategy: "Since its adoption in 1967. the 
strategy of A TO's ' flexible re ponse' did not hemJ umlcr ignificant 
chang~ in our !\lratcg1c milieu. Those changes made us as well as our 
enemies modernize our armament and the 'itruclurc of a rmed forces, 
Hnd kccp our strategic goals·•20 . The strategy of flexible respome dcfim:!d 
a new v.ay of uo;;ing nuckar .means. It was basically about accepting the 
possibility of selective and flexible use uf nuclear power and means in-
\lcm.l uf u general use of threat to use globaJ nuclear power. At Lhi.-. 
stage of NATO's military !> IT<~tcgy development, the plans of collective 
right to decide on the implementation of nuclear power were rejected and 
this right was tnmsferrcd tn the president of the USA Jn the contex1 of 
the given changes, European allies expressed their fear that the US/\ 
would not use nuclear power defending Europe in circumstances of nu-
cle~lr b:~ lance with the USSR. F.uropcans brradua lly started to believe that 
it was unlike ly that the US/\. would sacrify New York ur s~m Francisco 
hec1t11sc of F.urnpe. Such fear becnme evident in the attem pt to create 
their own nuclear me<~ns made hy Francc21 amJ Great Britain. In order 
to alleviate allies' doubts concerning the defence of the West wi th nuclear 
weapon-., lhc USA ueveloped tactica l nuclenr means along with their con-
ventional forces in Europe. New clevclnpmcnL", comlitions and relations on 
the European stage and roles of superpowers were reflected on the neeu 
for furlhcr correctim1s of c:xisting strategic options. An important impact 
of buropean members on American '>t.amlpo1nL\ reganling military a~pects 
of European security should be added here. As a result of the estimates, 
made by American strnlegi~t' in the mit.l-cightie., that 1ATO and the 
USA do not have appropriate deterrence means for a short-term, inten-
'iivc convcmjcmal \\ar in EUJope. the strategy of "forward defence~ was 
adopted along with coalition '\lralegy of "fleXIble rc.<opou. c··. The strategy 
of ''forward defence" was based on the assumption tbat the forces of the 
lhcn War;.uw pact were to be forced to enter the decisive battle in tbe 
border areas, which would preserve the depth nf Europcau te rritory aod 
would reduce tbe need for complex and risk)' transfer of large conven-
tional force.-. of the United States of 1\rnerica in order to organize a 
counter offensive, because this role would he taken hy Laclical nuclear 
nrms. This resulted in two concepts of the use of military forces within 
the framework nf 1hc "forward defence" strategy, being: "FoUow-Oo 
1"' Ju C10atiau liternture strntegies of "flexible response'', "realistic diversion" 
and "<; tralcgic glohalism'' are (fi~cn~sed. See: Vukadinovic R., ihid., pp. 104-J73. 
111 Gulvin J., ··comparing forct:.<> - NATO and Wns snw Pact'', NATO's Sixteen 
Nations. April-May, 1988, p. 15. 
!I Fmnce developed its own nuclear forces hig enough lo cover cncm} ·s terri-
tory 
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Forces Attack (FOFA)" as NATO' doctrine in Europe and "Air-umd 
Hattie" as lhe doctrine of American ground tmops22 
The wllt~pse of comrnu ni-.m caused not only the faJJ of tbe Berlin waiJ 
bur also the fall of lhe "forward defence" strategy in the Central Euro-
pean war '>l:Cne. The new pul-l-cold war situation challen~ed dirc:ctly the 
basic postull\les of thc: '·forward defence:" ~lmtegy. The reunification of 
(iermany and tl1c: shift of the frontier to the East made the plans con-
cerning th~,; nse of milit<uy f~1rces of Eastern Hnd Southeastern European 
countries as well ru NATO anachronic and the search for a new model 
of European 'ccurity started. fn such circumstance~ NATO started a pro-
round reorganization of iu forc.es directc:t.l towards the Slrc:nborthening or 
multin;~tional troop:-, the enlargemen t of air mobility, rhc perfecting of 
leadership ami oommand noll thl! improvement of decision making prnce-
dures.2..' NATO has umlc rgone significant evolution in its fourty-five years· 
cxisrence. 1t took place both becau'>C of tile change.-. occurring \\.'ithin Lhe 
alliance iL~iclf through the gmwing number of member states, through the 
change.'\ in the member states themselvt:l> and in their interrelations, and 
because of outsid~,; factors through developments in international relation~ 
generally. and particuJarly ir1 the adverse bloc. The end of the: culcl war 
and the disintegration of the Warsaw pact in the early nineties made 
A TO face nt..-w challenges e pcdaUy regarding cnuntries of Eastern ttnd 
Southea:-.tern Gurope and Russia. At that lime the proclaimed goal was: 
"Stahle security in Europe is the nwin goal and ra ixon d'etre of NATO. 
In order to achieve this ~oal, many negotiators keep discussing new initia-
tives un military control'' 4 • This was tltc topic of the TO summit in 
London in the mid-nineties, '''here rhe dedaration of the transformation 
of the NATO pact was i. uecl. 
The dedaration emphasized that positive changes in Europe:: required a 
modification of ATO. In other words, the issue of NATO'" dissolution 
wu" never on the agenda as •·nobody can be certain ahout the future. We 
need to stay Logether in order l o prolong a Jcmg-lasting peace ... " z.-; ln 
the context of this, the uniletl Germany wa..- seen by the All<•ntic Treaty 
as u contribution to the realization of a just and long-lasting security sys-
tem in aU Europe. Tbe proclaimed direction is that NATO is exclu ively 
22 l~ogers B.. "Follow-On Fo1 ces Allack: Myths amJ Rcahtics-. N/1 TO Rcvten~ 
fl. 1994, p. 22. 
23 lluysman P., "New Face iu NA I 0 ,., Miliwy Rc~7cn~ Seprembcr, 199-1, p 
19-25. 
2-l Ilamm M.R 11nd Pohlman l-1., uMilitary Doclrines :.od Suategi~ lhe Miss-
ing Keys to Success in Convenrional Arms Control '!" 1\usscnpolitik, Quaterly Ed., 
1, L990, p. 52. 
25 Medunurodn11 polirika. 968, Auguc;t 1990. p. J6. 
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a defensive aWance and it \\":ts fm1hcr emphasized that Europe has been 
changing and that the Treaty bas to a lte r its attihule tu dcfcnct:. The 
changes underway in the Fm.t and future steps were considered in particu-
htr. Tlu: declaration emphasizes: " We ATO) nndcr-tam.l thal, in a new 
Europe security nf each !->tale is firmly tied to the secuncy of it-; neigh-
bouring coumry. NATO has to bccumc an institution wbere Europeans. 
C'.amttlianl> and Americans work alongside, nor on.ly on common defence 
but also towards crating new partnership with all European countries. The 
Atlantic community has to mrn tow<mh. Ea<;t European countries thai 
were m ar adversaries in the cold war and offer them a friendly ham.l".16 
11. 
The disappearance of the Warsaw Pad. the collapse nf communist sys-
tems in Ea~o.lcm Eurnpt: and the disintegration of multinational federations 
that caused the wars on the Balkans and in Transcausasia, made NATO 
direct its efforts more to Eastern l:.urope and try to stop lhc negative se-
curity tendcncic.'i. Numt:rous NATO actions, though lacking in decisiveness, 
ensued. Inte restingly, at the cntl uf 1993 for the flfst time m history 
NA TO"s regular annual conference was held in Hungary, <~ "late which is 
nor a member of Lhi-. alli:.Uice. The choice of Hungary by ATO's offi-
cials was made deliberately. H ungary a · well al. the CL.Cch Republic. S.lo-
vakia anti Poland, besides experiencing a bard time dunng the occupation 
by the former USSR after World War 11. also represented the bases for 
Rus~ian actions towards the West. The above mentioned Centml European 
counrrie-. arc 'till very ignificant for European security as they were in 
the former Warsaw Pact due tu their geuslmlegic position. r Upon the 
dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, i lungary, the Czech Repuhlic.:, Slovakia 
and Poland ~tarted intensive activity regarding their defence system and 
military forces. 1n onler tn define nt:w Jdence strategies following demo-
cratic changes, they all tried hard to enter A TO, which wuukl result in 
the n.:tluetion of their own military potential and would help a faster eco-
nomic development. Ap~1rl from lhul, /\talesmen of these countries are 
convinced that their membership in the North Atl<1ntic Tr~Hiy would h<! a 
2t> lb1dcm. 
27 These four countries are also called uThe ViSegrMI Four"', and due to lhc 
security vacuum in Central Europe, NATO '~lubli:;bcd very iut~o~u:.he cooperation. 
See: Rosc;er Baldwin, u Addr~smg !he Security Concerns of Central Europe 
Through • ATO-. Europt:311 Se:curiry. 1, 1993, pp. :-4R-549. 
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lnng-term guarantee for peace in thi." pan of Europl!.28 They shan~ the 
view that thi)l. could also repre~l!nl the model for the admission to NATO 
membcr.-hip of other Eastern European countries or wouiJ pctve the way 
for the formation of a regionol alliance under the sponsorship of N/\ TO. 
AJI consideration about the p<l,ilion and role of_ JATO, including 
American, ttre based on the <lSSUmption that NATO IS undouhtctlly the 
wnrld miJitary, technological, political and economic superpower of the 
western hemisphere countries ns we ll as that NATO has an exceptional 
impact on the world. NATO was neither fiTht nor the last military politj-
e<ll alliance rnatle after World War n by most West European countrie:-
and NortJ1 America. However. ATO was undnuhtedly extreme!~ impor-
tant for Eu ropean counrries, the USA ami Canada. Having gathered the 
most developed countries of Weste rn burope, NATO became tbe basic 
and permanent institutional framework of their political coordination and 
action, the centre ur all military polil.iatl organization of Wc'>tern countries 
which came into being either hcfnre or after Ult: C'-lablishment of 1\ TO 
including the increasingly autonomous WesL European Union (WEU). 
Due to modest result~ achieved in the St ·t and with tbc gnal of ac-
celerating the development of the stxrnity system of Eastern and South-
eastern Europe:, a well as in Rus.-.ia, ATO held a -.ummit in Brill )loci-; in 
January of 1994. Unlike previous sull1Jl1its, the results of thi~ one were 
nuL expected only hy its 16 members, but by more that ten ca ndidates 
for trus organization's membership. At the NATO summit in Brw sels the 
main topics for discu !.ion were, as expected: the strengthening of the 
.. transatlantic connection" by improved American-European relations anti by 
defining securily strategies on the 'European cuntineot for the 2 l~t century, 
witJt lht: focus on Easte rn and Southeaste rn Europe, Russia aod the wur 
in Bosnia-Hercegovina. The mcmhers of NATO which needed concord at 
this summit more than ever hefore. tried to tli'>Cuss only Lupit.."" for which 
there ,.,.,.., a high degree of agreement. The chief re uiL of the summit 
was signing of tJ11; document ' 'Partnership for Peare", a new platform for 
re lations with " new democracies". " Partnership for Peace" wa$ presented 
as a conceptual document of Europt!an security at the beginning of the 
2 Lst century by which the demncnttic cou ntries outside NATO are given 
possibilil) fur cooperation with it:. political and mLiitary hodies and by 
whlch perspectives for full membership a re o pened. AJibough after lhe 
summit the countries of Easte rn and Southeaste rn Europe exprl!ssed tbe.ir 
dissatisfaction regardil1g its resu lts, a~.:cording to NATO office rs tlwir 
chances of en tering the military political alliance following tJ1e principle 
"country by country" were enhanced owing to the " Partnef\hip for Peace•·. 
These new democratic tXnmtnes were primariJy di.ssati~ficd because of rheir 
28 See: Valki L., "A Future Security Architecture for Europe". Eul'C>pcan 
Security, 4. 1993, pp. 522-528 
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desire to ent er NATO as soon as possible, which would allow them to 
get protection under Article 5 of the Atlantic Treaty. lt guarantees pro-
tection in case of attack to all its full members. This also made the 
member countries of NATO, which defined the criteria for joining U1e 
"Partnership for Peace", cautious because according to Article 10 of the 
Atlantic Treaty consensus of all full members regarding accepting new 
members is required. Those criteria are also stated in the very document: 
"This partnership was established to express common belief that the stabil-
ity and security of the Euro-AtJantic region can he accomplishet.l only by 
cooperation and common actions. Protection and promotion of basic free-
doms :1nd civil rights and guaranteeing these freedoms, justice and peace 
through democracy represent common values this Partnership is basct.l 
upon". The member states of North /\tlantic Treaty and other countries 
that join this alliance are by I heir cooperation reaffirming their commit-
ment to preserve democratic societies, to protect their own freedoms 
from aggressiun am.l threats and to keep following the principles of inter-
national law. They are confirming their readiness to mee1 I he ir obligations 
towards the UN Charter in good faith, as well as the principles of the 
Universal Dechmttion OTt Civil RighLc;, in particular to refrain fmm threat-
ening territorial integrity or political independence of any country by the 
use of force, to respect the existing borders and to resolve conflicts 
peacefully. They <Lre also confirming their full acceptance nf the Helsinki 
Final Document and a.IJ other CSCE documents as well as obligations re-
garding disarmament and arms control".29 The most significant stimulus 
fnr the realization of the "Partnership for Peace" was given hy the 
American president Clinton, who managed to convince the until recently 
opposing parties but cunently interested in entering NATO to be patient 
and gradua lly earn theiJ: full membership of NAT0.30 "Partnership for 
Pence" is not a temporary solution which might become permanent and 
whidt would postpone the au:cptan<.:e of new countries, members of 
NATO. It clearly states that NATO members do not intend to give in to 
any pressures regarding immediate acceptance of candidates, and American 
officials remind that a unanimous de.cision about the ac<.:ept~tn<.:e of t1 new 
NATO member would require a prior 2/3 majority vote by the American 
Senate, which is very hard to expect. Those studying the document 
"Partnership for Peace" more carefully could read between lines tbllt there 
is actually a deliberate lack of political and security earmarking of coun-
tties from the Baltic to the Balkans. This was based on ao article written 
by Warren Christopher, American State Secretary, who defines the area of 
the " Partnership for Peace'' as an area of Central and Eastern Europe 
u1cluding a part of the former USSR, wht:re rcfom1s and lhe development 
of democracy is in progress, but where nothing is ce.rtain. "Extremists, 
wbo misuse economic problems in order to stir up bypernationalism" ant.l 
29 McdumirOJna po}jtik<l, 1026, May 1994, p. 30-31. 
:30 Tatalovic, S .. "NATO u krizi", Slobodna Dalmacija, January 9, 191.J4, p. 17. 
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" nations lrappcd in international fTictions for many ccntnries" both ·•an:: 
capable of threatening Lh~: progress of reforml> and the stability of We:·t-
em Europe''. As these countries impatiently knock on the door of West-
ern association • primariJy NATO - a t the ame time justly fearing that 
their peoples might Lire on their "way to Europe" and that great Russian 
imperialism will get blown out of pmportions the USA and the West-
em ddcnce alli:tnce are willing to offer thent "pragmatic cooperation in 
the :lrea of defence planning, training unrl preparation for possible joint 
operation!\". However. bearing in mind that the "cc::ntral mission of NATO 
i · tbe defence of the Western alhance ''. all the offered partnership activi-
tie "will not interfere v. ith joint command struct ures nf NATO, its deci-
sion mak.mg mechanism/>, nor will they interfere with their commitment for 
common defence. " Thus " Partnership for Peace" is becoming something 
thut i. supposed only to '·he lp the adjustment of NATO action potentials 
iu vital area such as cri.,is management, tmn-.portation of huma11itarinn 
aid and peace keeping". ·The very partit..ipation in ' Partnership for Peace· 
does not gu:Jrantee A TO ruemhcrsbip and the Allianct!' dec1 ion on nc;:w 
membership wiiJ be ba.'\cd on realistic evaluation of tbe need nf transat-
lantic seetu ity and on the readiness of e::~ch candidate uiUnlry to accept 
common tiL:fence responsibilitie:-~ of the member stat e".'11 Therefore, all 
the countries outside NATO will. me.taphoriallly speaking:, ''be left outside 
in the cold". lntcrl! tingly. ·'Partnership of Peace" is opened not only to 
countries undergoing the pnX'l: · of democratiz.atiun but also to until re-
cently neuual coumric - P'inland, S"\\cuen, Switzerland and Anstria.32 At 
tht' preparation stage of the UP<Jr1nersllip for Peace", ufficiaJ Moscow was 
wami11g that the expansion of NATO to countries of Eastern ;md South-
eastern Europe could have a negative impact oo Russin's home atfairs 
and its relations with Westem partners, primarily the USA Those warn-
ing: were implicit in the <;tatements given hy the Russian president Uoris 
Yeltsin. as well n those given by other Rus..-,ian officials. Accordin!t tu 
thc:m, pu~hing rhe oorders of ATO towards Rul>sia could lead to un-
wanted reaction~ of Rw-.l'ian people a:od military circles, which would dest-
abilize peace and force Russia tn undertake counte~lcps which would ~ive 
the oppo!\i tion a pretext for its extremist positions. They also emphttsized 
Lbat the American formula '.Partnership for Peace'' reprc.,ent an accept-
able solution fnr all countries. thu upportin~ anu facihratin~ rhe accep-
tance of the document a t the NATO summit.' The re ponsc: to Russian 
wurnings was reflected in moderate und cauuous decision making and 
readiness for cooperation with all willing countrit!l>, in the first place with 
Russia. This is how the USA and NATO nllies a ttempted to incorporate 
II See Christopher \ .. The 1Vashingtor1 Times. January 9, 1994. p. 2. 
n Brdoric 0_ .. l';moerstvo £a mir: Cekaonia~ zu ~A 10-. lljesaik, Janual)' & 
1994, p. 7 
33 Tatnlovic, S.. " Neeista savjest AT0-11", SJobodna Du!macija, Jrlnuary 13, 
1994, r. 12. 
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the countries of Eastern and Southeastern Europe into their technologie<~l 
sl mel urcs hy collahnrating on civilian and military projects. For compara-
tive advantages, according to future plans, the hibernated military indus-
trial cnmrlex of the East will be revived, but under NATO supervision. 
T his enables very fast eoonom ie assistance tn thcse countries, but at tbe 
same time it makes them technologically dependent on The W est, which is 
slrategically significant from the point of view of European security. 
Twenty six countries joined the "P:~rtner.ship for Peace" in 1994 and at 
the beginning of 1995 thus, stnrting to compete in adjusting their poliliatl 
and defence systems Lo high criteria set for NATO membership. Pro-
spective candidates would have to meet two hasic prereyuisitcs: they need 
tn complete thorough reorganization and the adjustment of their military 
forces to NATO standards whi~,;h arc extremely demanding and imply 
creation of stable democracy in the country. Changing the existing military 
infras tructure is very demanding in the area of amutment, soldier training, 
recruitment of the armed forces, leadership ami command and army su-
peivision. Also, each country needs to present clearly and publicly its own 
s~,;curily situa tion aml its overall defence capacities, publicly stating the de-
fence budget, giving figures of their military industries, stating 1 he exact 
number of troops with no besitntion nnd ambiguity, stating the number of 
;wtivc .solt.li!!rs and officers, thc actual number of rese1ve, of arms, particu-
larly heavy arms, its age, source and the like. The geostrategic pos ition of 
a country, its geo-political advantage, non-existence of inner conflicts, re-
fraining from involvemenl in mililary conflicts and commitmcnl to democ-
racy are factors contributing to the country's admission into NATO. Be-
sides, in accordance with the given ctiteria it is not possible to enter 
NATO without being subjected to two kinds of contml. T he fiTs l refers lo 
monitoting the degree of politicization of the army, which means keeping 
the balancc of the influence political parties have on the military struc-
ture, which is NATO's standard common practice. The second refers to 
pennanent civilian control over defence and semi-military forces in order 
to avoid their interference in the political life of a particular country or 
prevent various inadequate procedures that could threaten the constitu-
tional and legal system.34 Although it has not yet been clearly stated 
which coun tries mecl mnst t.Tileria, acconJing to Wcstcm stTalcgisls, those 
are: Poland, llungary and the CZech Republic. Although nearly all Euro-
pean countries outside NATO have made an official claim fo r theiT enter-
ing the "Partnership for Peace", NATO leadcrship diLl nnt invite all the 
countries to join the Pa rtnership, among others, Croatia and nosn.ia-IIer-
cegovina, while special attention bas been directed to Russia. NATO wants 
to foster Russia's dose cooperation and intq,rration. H owever, on lhc 
other hand, it is not willing to give Russia the status which would entitle 
it to veto or which would allow Russia to have an impact on decisions 
made by the At1an6c military alliance. After a lot of negotiation and co-
34 Visoar F., "Yojska pod uaLizorom", Vjesnik, August 9, 1994, p. lG. 
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ordination of inturc~;ts, on June 22, 1994, Russia entered the "Pa rtnership 
for Puacc" :1s the 21st countJy. Tlte amcession only Russia was given is a 
special " protocol" act:unling to which the West ami NATO need to con-
sult Russia in advance on all tmportant ;,.,ucs concerning world security in 
arc:ts of special Russian intcrc;;t. Russian entrance to .. Partnership for 
Peace" was not welcomed in tbe Russian political life hec<mse this did not 
give Ru. sia the status of a big country and Mlkhael Uorbacbow think' 
·'that it is ;~n example of inferiority of today·s Russian politics and the 
short -sightedness of the West".35 J\lthough Boris Yeltsin supported! and 
accepted the "Partnership for Peace", he is not fully satisfied with it ei-
ther. ln his nnnuaJ \pccch in the Russian parliament in which he defined 
his forei!:,rn <tnd domesuc pohttcal strateg_v for 1995. he firmly opposed the 
ide:.1 of expanding 'ATO tu Eastern l.:.uropean countric\. YelLin stated 
tbat this idea wa h:1 ed on non-existent Mo~cow's '·black plans''. "There 
are no such thoughts in Moscow ami NATO's expansion to Lhc Western 
Russian borders could have a oegatjve impact o n Lhc development of the 
European security system'' said Yellsin. "At this momeot a ucw long-
term F.mopean and world system is rleveloping and it is cs.scn ti:t l for this 
process to be based ou m1ttm1l cooperation and rc\pect of legal rights 
and interests of any country and not on egoist confrontations or the lngic 
of in,tant gnm".36 According to YeiH:n, Europe is threatened by a new 
disumon which is not tn be aUowed and mi,using Russian partnership 
would throw Europe back into the l 9th century instead of taking it into 
a stable 21st century. 
Accepting what was offered them through the "Pa rtner.;hip for Peace'', 
countries of Eastem and Southeastern Europe .!.Wrted changing their mili-
tary structure. with the assistance uf NATO's experts and immediately 
rcali7ed that thts was probably the most complex present nndenaking and 
a nauonaJ priority with an uncertain outcome. Former Russian aJlie.'\ in 
the Warsaw p:tct would ljke to change not only the facode of the ir mili-
tary forces, but a lso to adjust the entire infrastructure to Western criterio, 
standards and norms.37 However. these countries are fllced with numerou~ 
problems which can be divided in four main categories. The fir:-.L c.ttegory 
refer; to th~ transformation nf these countries' military industry which was 
based on tbe Rtc ian model and which w~ employing a large number uf 
people.38 The disintegration or the Warsaw pacl and the disappearanc-e of 
JS Locma.uovic B., " l'anncrsrvo uz oslr~.: krilike", Vjesnik, June 23, 1994, p. 6. 
3<> Cited nccor·diog to: Lacmannvic B., "Oulucno protiv sirenjn NATO", 
VjesniJ., February l7, 1995, p. 10. 
3" ViSnar. F., ~Bolni odra7 c;Joma", Vj'esm'J., Augus1 2. 1991, p. l6. 
~ l-or example, in Lht: early njneties military ittdu:.lry in Po land employed 
about 160.()00 highly qunWied workcn. and expens or 1o/o of the total num'her of 
the counlry's work force. Today this oumbcr has been recluc-.cd by two lhi1 ds. A 
similrtr situation can be fo und in the l lungmian military i.uuuslry. 
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a afe market in the Third Wurkl countries caused the collapse of mili-
tary industry, who e transformauon requires huge investments. The b1gge.st 
problems in rhe tnm formation of military industry appear in Rus..-.ia. 
which is receiving the biggest finnncial support from iLl> Western alties for 
thelC solution. e p~::cially in the area of nuclear industry.J11 The -.~.:cond 
category of problems is a result of the "lowctl-uown process of depohtici-
zation of the ;nmy. For example, after Hungary's first democratic elections 
in 1990 fom1al depoliticization of the army took place. Thus, for the first 
time a c.ivilian politician took the head position in 1 he.: Ministry of De-
fence, the position of Head cllief-of-statf of the military forces wa:- llt:pa-
rated from the Ministry of Defence ami the po ition of the Supreme 
Commander, which is, according to the Consrtirution, held hy the.: Pn:sident 
of .Kepublic, was e tahli!.hed.40 However, in Hungary as weU as in other 
former socialist countries the influence nf military officers is still felt in 
the political life, and there is also diSagreement between "the old" and 
"the new" officers regarding many military forces related issues. Th~ third 
category of problems refers to army tr.tining and officers in particular. 
The existing tr.Jining !tystem which is based on the Russirm mudd need:. 
to be replaced by lhe new NATO model. Even though it was thought 
that the NATO training model could be introduced in a very short time 
simply by bringing n<.!w staff into military fo.-ces, it proved to be n much 
more complex and lasting proces, . The use of the most modern military 
technology, a rntameot and equipment, some of which arc usctl for the 
first time, and the acceplancc of modern principles of warfare technicpte 
are possible only in the presence of top military prnfessi.ooal expertise and 
competence, primarily of commanding structures. This is why countries 
which count on their entering NATO send their officers to Western mili-
tary schools. The fourth category of problems is related Lo the recruit-
ment of militmy forces. Tlte exi ting populous military forces recruit ed nn 
the basis of general enlistment need to he replaCt!d by military forces re-
\.TUiLt:d solely by professional soldiers or combined with ohligatnry militaf) 
service.~ • ATO commillec and superintendences wluch have visited the 
present member countries of the '·Partnership fnr Pcace .. found that their 
military force. are facing the problem of adequate recruitment th<tt \\nulc.J 
be in accordnnce with wc...,tcm ~tanc.Jarus. D ue to the existing problems of 
meeting NATO's criteria, most countries do not cxp~ct to join this mth-
tary political a lliance soon. For example, the Republic of Slovenia cxpc<.:ts 
to become a full member of the European Union between 1998 :md 2003 
39 See Cooper J. , "Transformu.lion uf lhe Russian Defence Industry'', J,7ne :<; 
lotelJ.igence R eview, 10. 1994, p. 415. 
40 Sauerwine H., .. Defence Adequacy-The HUDgariun Defence Forces", J:we"s 
Intelligence Re\ie"~ 10, \W4, p. 435. 
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at the be:, I. That woukl help Slovenia to enter NATO as a fuU member 
only in 2005 t~s a member of WElJ .42 
The war in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina has helped Ni\ TO officials 
to, upon realizing its tragic consequen~l>. convince Lite world tt~crors nf 
the n~.:ed to prevent its e.xpanston. The approach directed tOward! prevent-
ing the wur's expansion out ·ide Croatia and Dosnia-He n:egovina, enablt:tl 
NATO's current aml effortless penclr<ttion into a lmu ·t all countries of 
Easte rn and Southeastern Eumpc through thc UPannership fm Peace··. 
with the t:xccption of Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina. Prevcnring the e.x-
pansion uf the waJ o ut ide Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina. which NATO 
in ists on, is connected with the war's graduul expansion to Eastern and 
outheastcrn Europe. According to NATO officials, it i~ onJy when a firm 
security encirclement around the war area in the Balkans is formed that 
it is possible tn stop the war and establi h a just peace. Tl1iJo. approach is 
een by NATO memben. <~s well as by the memberJo. of the " Parlllt:rship 
for Peace" as cheaper and safer. However, in this way NATO and the in-
ternational community, conscinu ·ly or not. arc imposing Utt: hurden of re-
solving the B alkan crisiJo. and the COJo.L'\ of establishing a new security sy -
tt:m in th.is part of Europe on Croatia and Bm;nia-Herc~govina~ countries 
which would, accordiJ1g to present state of affairs, be <lllowed to enter the 
·' Partm:rsbip fo r Pt:uce" only wht:n these coslS ure paid. According to 
'>tandard criteriu, Croatia and Bosma-Hercegovina can count on entea ing 
the - Partnership for Peace~ only after they resolve their internal connicts 
and their conflicts with neighbouring c~untries hy political ntcan~. How-
ever, depending on fut1her developments in Eastern Hnd Southeastern 
Europt:, Croatia might corer the "Partnership for Peace·· avoiding regular 
procedure. This wouJd mean ill> puUing out uf the interest Jo.phere of the 
new Russian strategy of c~pandmg to l11c Balkans. 
Hoping to lwve found adc4nate respons~-; to histotical challenge of 
the European continent after the cold war and tin: dissolution of the 
WaJ"S<tw pact. 1 A TO allies offen:tl rbe "Part lll-"TShip for Peace., to their 
yeste rday·s adversaries. This project of glohal securi ty for the 21st century 
is one form of American and NATO involvement on a military-•;ecurity 
level in "burope from Vancouver to Vladivostok". ft is supposed to re-
nlve four essential problems uf European 'ecurity: first, Lh~ adjustment of 
NATO's political and military structu res to new gl!ostrategic comlilions m 
Europe; second, openness of NATO to other European countries fo r co-
operation and gradual membership: third, paving the w<Jy for turning the 
North Allantic Treaty into a " forum for agreement" in solving cri,es: and 
forth, taking po itiun against thc expansion of "'massive destmction arms'' 
and for the ban and prevc::ntiun of nuclear arms prolifc::nuion. "Partnt:rship 
for Peace'' is only a part of this pltm on the line of long-tt.:rm and 
-1:! Geciak, T .. "~A 1'0-Sioveniju .. , Revija Obr:unbu, ~o. 3, 19Q5, p. 4. 
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complex cooper~tion nf "new democracies·· with ATO. while the uiLrmate 
goaJ is the in tegration of these cuuntric~ inLn NATO. 
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